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We define a new model for algorithms to reach Byzantine Agreement. It allows 
one to measure the complexity more accurately, to differentiate between processor 
faults, and to include communication link failures. A deterministic algorithm is 
presented that exhibits early stopping by phase 2f+ 3 in the worst case, where f is 
the actual number of faults, under less stringent conditions than the ones of 
previous algorithms. Its average performance can also easily be analysed making 
realistic assumptions on random distribution of faults. We show that it stops with 
high probability after a small number of phases. © 1985 Academic Press, Inc. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Distributed in contrast o central controlled computing seems capable of 
increasing reliability and availability. The intention is to design systems 
that continue correct execution even if some limited number of elements 
become faulty. A faulty processor may send conflicting messages to other 
processors. Since this may cause nonaccordant actions performed by the 
other individual processors they have to achieve some kind of agreement or 
unanimity on certain decisions. This problem has first been studied in Lam- 
port, Shostak, and Pease (1982); Pease, Shostak, and Lamport (1980) and 
called the Byzantine generals problem. A distinguished processor, the 
transmitter or general, keeps a private value, on which the others have to 
agree. Byzantine agreement (BA) is achieved when: 
(I) all correct processors agree on the same value, and 
(II) if the transmitter is correct, then all correct processors agree on 
its value. 
This simple problem seems to model a basic task for reliable distributed 
computations. For further discussion the reader may consult Lamport et al. 
(1982); Pease et al. (1980); Dolev and Strong (1982b, 1982c). 
* This research was done while visiting the IBM Research Laboratory, San Jose. This paper 
is a revised and expanded version of a paper presented at the International Conference on 
"Foundations of Computation Theory" held in Borgholm, Sweden, August 21-27, 1983. 
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Dolev (1982, 1981); Dolev, Fischer, Fowler, Lynch, and Strong (1982); 
Dolev and Reischuk (1982); Dolev, Reischuk, and Strong (1982); Dolev 
and Strong (1982a, 1982c, 1983); Fischer and Lynch (1982); Pease et al. 
(1980) prove lower bounds for algorithms to reach BA for various com- 
plexity measures as the time or the amount of information exchange and 
also give several deterministic algorithms for it. We assume that processors 
are pairwise connected by communication links and that information 
exchange always takes place in synchronous phases, in which each 
processor may send messages to other processors. An algorithm may either 
be authenticated or nonauthenticated. In the first case the processors share a 
signature scheme which allows each one to sign messages, such that 
nobody else can alter a signed message or forge a signature. The only 
assumption in the nonauthenticated case is that each processor can uni- 
quely identify the sender of a message. Here we will only consider non- 
authenticated algorithms. 
Dolev, Reischuk, and Strong (1982) observe that one should distinguish 
between two different kinds of agreement: immediate and eventual Byzantine 
agreement (IBA and EBA). EBA requires conditions (I) and (II), IBA also 
requires that the correct processors decide on the value at the same phase. 
Let n be the total number of processors and assume for the present hat 
communication links always work correctly. The main results relevant o 
this paper can be summarized by the following: 
(1.1) To reach EBA or IBA by a nonauthenticated algorithm the 
number of faulty processors must be less than ½ of the total number of 
processors (Pease et al., 1980). 
(1.2) If t is a bound for the maximum number of faults an algorithm 
is supposed to handle and f< t is the actual number of faults then in no 
case IBA can be reached before phase t + 1, and in the worst case EBA not 
before phase f+ 2 (Fischer and Lynch, 1982; Dolev and Strong, 1982c, 
1983). 
Assume that a distributed system consists of many processors. There 
might arise situations in which a relatively large percentage of the 
processors is incorrect, although such a situation may be very unlikely. 
Because of (1.2) there is no algorithm with small worst case time com- 
plexity to reach any kind of agreement. If one wants to reach IBA, in any 
case a correct algorithm has to run a long time, even when there are no 
faults at all in the system. 
The lower bound t + 1 is matched by an algorithm in Pease et al. (1980), 
but that algorithm requires exchanging an exponential (in t) amount of 
information. The algorithm in Dolev et al. (1982) needs 2t + 3 phases while 
sending only a small number of messages, polynomial in n and t. Concern- 
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ing the ratio between correct and incorrect processors both match the 
bound of (1.1). 
However, there is some hope that at least EBA can be reached earlier. 
The worst case lower bound f+ 2 (which in general will be much smaller 
than t + 1) is actually achieved by an algorithm in Dolev, Reischuk, and 
Strong (1982), but it can only be used in case of a small number of faults 
[n I> 2t 2 + O(t)]. Another algorithm in that paper works for n ~> 3t + 1 and 
gives the time bound 2f+ 5. Under favorable conditions both algorithms 
may stop even earlier. 
Unanimity seems to be necessary for distributed computing. Therefore 
agreement algorithms are a basic operation for unreliable systems and very 
fast and simple procedure are of great interest. Unfortunately, the known 
(nonauthenticated) algorithms require a rather complex implementation 
and even the f+ 2 bound for EBA may still be quite large for systems con- 
taining thousands of processors. 
Despite this lower bound are there ways to improve efficiency? For prac- 
tical applications it would be important to have at least algorithms of small 
average case complexity, where we average the possible occurences of faults 
given some probability distribution. Such an analysis seems to be very dif- 
ficult for the known algorithms that may stop earlier unless one makes 
severe and unrealistic restrictions on the behavior of faulty processors. The 
reason is that these algorithms hare the following property: 
If the transmitter sends a certain amount on inconsistent messages at the 
first phase, then by sending wrong messages at phase two, each of the 
remaining processors can prevent the other processors from reaching 
agreement within the next phases, even if those are all correct. If one 
processor behaves ufficiently faulty at the second phase, the same holds for 
the following phase and the already correct processors: by sending the right 
number of inconsistent messages each one of them can confuse the others 
in such a way that they cannot reach agreement at this or the next phase. 
This may go on until there are no more faulty processors. 
For the expected run time we get stronger esults if we only assume some 
random distribution of faulty processors, but make no assumption 
regarding what a faulty processor actually does. With respect o this the 
worst case is allowed. We will show that under this setting one can still 
design very efficient algorithms. This is achieved by a mechanism that 
enables at most one (instead of all) processor per phase to pevent the 
others from reaching agreement within the next phases. 
The performance of algorithms to reach BA has been evaluated so far 
only by their time complexity and the amount of information that has to be 
exchanged. It is also important o consider the complexity of the internal 
computations. For example, the algorithm in Pease et al. (1980) does not 
only require to exchange an exponential number of messages, each 
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processor also has to store all the incoming information till phase t + 1 
when it is able to decide on the value. This is necessary because the 
decision function heavily depends on every single message ver received, 
and there seems to be no way to simplify the evaluation of this particular 
function. 
We also address the problem which processors have to be considered 
faulty and for which period of time. The known algorithms require to 
count a processor as a faulty one for the whole algorithm whenever it 
makes a single mistake at some point of time. For a large distributed 
system performing extended computation this solution is not desirable, 
because during the whole period of time almost all processors might be 
down at least for a little while. 
If, to guarantee the correctness of an algorithm, each such processor has 
to be considered completely faulty the required reliability may become very 
high and in practice not be achievable. From the practical point of view 
this requirement is not necessary. If a processor is faulty it could either be 
repaired or replaced by a new processor. Then this processor or its suc- 
cessor could be reintegrted by the system and after some time of recovery 
used as a reliable element again. 
Therefore it would be of interest o have a notion of incorrectness that 
better differentiates between different kinds of faulty behavior. We would 
like to have algorithms that reach agreement for any number of faulty 
processors as long as only a small number of faults occurs within each 
phase. This does not contradict (1.1), since in our present context that 
result should be stated more precisely: 
(1.3) Byzantine agreement can only be achieved if in each phase less 
than ½ of the total number of processors are faulty. 
An algorithm that handles more faults spread over time has to rein- 
tegrate processors that temporarily went down. For this purpose the com- 
plexity of the internal computation is also an important factor. If this is 
large, it may not be possible or involve too much work to provide a once 
faulty processor with the information needed to continue correct com- 
putation. 
Finally we also want to include communication link failures as possible 
faults. So far this has only be done in Dolev and Strong (1982b) which 
defines the number of equivalent processor faults. This is the minimal num- 
ber of processors needed to include all faulty processors and for each faulty 
communication link at least one of its incident processors. It is easy to see 
that an algorithm that can stand t faulty processors can also reach 
agreement for t equivalent processor faults at least among the correct 
processors that are connected to correct links. 
For larger systems this observation does not really solve the problem 
BYZANTINE GENERALS PROBLEM 27 
unless one makes the unrealistic assumption of decreasing failure 
probability. According to (1.1) the number of processor faults that can be 
tolerated may grow linearly with the size of the system, alternatively one 
can assume a fixed probability of processor failure. But a simple calculation 
shows that if links may become faulty with some fixed probability, then, 
with probability growing exponentially quickly to 1, almost every 
processor is needed to cover all faulty links. Even if an algorithm existed 
that could handle that many processor faults there would be almost no 
processors guaranteed to join the unanimous decision. 
Because of these extensions we will define a model for an agreement 
algorithm in Section 2 which is different from the ones used in Dolev and 
Strong (1982c, Dolev and Reischuk (1982); Dolev, Reischuk, and Strong 
(1982). 
In Section 3 we describe a deterministic algorithm. Its worst case time 
complexity is 2 f+ 3 (remember f denotes the actual number of faults) and 
it works for any number of faults if one of the following conditions holds: 
(1.4) There are no communication link failures and in each interval 
of three consecutive phases less than ~ of the total number of processors 
behave in a faulty manner. 
(1.5) Within each phase the ratio between the number of processors, 
that are faulty or have more than 5 % faulty communication links, and the 
total number of processors i less than 2@ 
This means that a lot more than ½ of the processors may make mistakes 
during the algorithm as long as not too many do it at the same time. 
The improvement is achieved by the following elements which seem to be 
new in this context: First, the algorithm is less uniform. For each two con- 
secutive phases there is one special processor. Its behavior in these phases 
essentially determines whether all the (at that time) correct processors are 
able to reach agreement in the next few phases or not. This yields a 
2f+ const, worst case time bound. Under the reasonable assumption that 
the probability of failure of a processor does not depend on this assignment 
one can easily show that with high probability the algorithm stops within a 
few phases. 
Second, only "numbers are counted." By this we mean that for each 
processor p the decision, whether to send a certain message or to commit 
to a value at a given phase, depends only on how many messages of a cer- 
tain type p received, not which particular processors ent these messages. 
There is only one exception to this rule and that is the role of the special 
processor for that phase. Therefore, except for the special processor, it does 
not matter which particular processors are faulty at a phase, they may vary 
from phase to phase. We also almost get rid of the requirement that the 
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sender of each message can uniquely be identified. Except for the special 
processor the sender does not need to be known assuming that a faulty 
processor cannot send more than one message to another processor per 
phase. For each correct processor also some of its links may be faulty 
without affecting its decision. 
Last, simple rules determine the behavior of a processor. It depends only 
on the messages recieved at the very last phases. This makes implemen- 
tation, internal computation, and reintegration easy. 
2. A MODEL FOR AGREEMENT ALGORITHMS 
Let PR--- {Pl ..... p~,} be the set o fn  processors. For 1 <~i,j<<,n there is a 
communication link (edge) from Pi to pj by which Pi can send messages to 
pj. p~ denotes the transmitter. Let STp be a set of states for p ~ PR, V be the 
set of values the transmitter may possibly hold, and let MSG denote a set 
of messages the processors may send to each other. We think of MSG as 
the powerset of some set of atomic messages. 
An agreement algorithm for PR is defined by a set of functions {(Fp, 
Mp)l pe PR, Fp: MSG" x STp~ STp and Mp: STp~ MSG~}. The algo- 
rithm consists of running synchronous phases of message sending, message 
receiving, and internal computation (state transition). Such a sequence of 
phases is called a history. According to the message sending .function Mp, 
which depends on its current state, processor p is supposed to send 
messages to other processors at the beginning of a phase. At the end of a 
phase p will receive the messages sent to it by other processors during that 
phase and depending on this information and its current state change into 
a new state as specified by the state transition function Fp. This state will 
also be the state of p at the beginning of the next phase. 
For receiving as for sending messages the ith element of a sequence from 
MSG" when applied to Fp, respectively, produced by Mp denotes the infor- 
mation transfer between p and processor pi. We make the technical 
assumption that each processor also sends a message to itself. If a value of 
Mp is a sequence of identical entries then for simplicity we will specify only 
one such entry instead of the whole vector. In the following this will always 
be the case. 
To contrast with previous work we make the following definition. An 
agreement algorithm is uniform if the pairs of message sending and state 
transition functions are the same for all processors. All the known 
algorithms possess this property or come very close. For the algorithm 
presented in the next section nonuniformity is an essential ingredient. 
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For the transmitter, STp includes states a~ for v e V corresponding to the 
values it may hold at the beginning, while for other processors there is just 
one state ao in which p starts. Each STp also includes a final state ZA for 
each subset A of V. We require that for a final state s Mp(s) equals the 
sequence of empty messages. Notice that we do not necessarily exclude 
transitions from final states back into nonfinal states. 
In each phase each processor p and each communication link (p, q) from 
p to a processor q is either in the faulty or nonfaulty mode. Wealso use the 
terms correct (resp. incorrect). Let an agreement algorithm 
{(Fp, Mp)l p ~ PR} for a distributive system PR be given and, in a history 
H of that algorithm, processor p be in state s at the end of phase k -  1. If, 
in phase k of H, p is in the nonfaulty mode it sends the sequence of 
messages Mp(s) at that phase, otherwise it may send anything. If, in phase 
k, q and link (p, q) are nonfaulty, q at the end of phase k actually receives 
the message sent by p, otherwise q may receive anything. Let Y be the 
sequence of messages p receives at phase k. In the nonfaulty mode p goes 
into the new state Fp(Y, s), otherwise it may enter an arbitrary state. 
Notice that in general the transition of p in the faulty mode is completely 
unpredictable, in particular we do not exclude incorrect ransitions into 
final states. It does not make sense to require that a processor stays in a 
final state once it is reached, otherwise no algorithm can guarantee that 
processos will be reintegrated later. They may incorrectly enter a final state 
either when they were temporarily faulty or when they were forced to do so 
by wrong messages of faulty links. In either case they would have to be 
considered faulty for the rest of the algorithm and it would be impossible 
to handle a large number of failures spread over the time. 
Let ~, 0 ~< ~ ~< 1, be a lower bound for the ratio of correct to all com- 
munication links connected to a processor. A processor p is called 7-correct 
in phase k if in that phase p is correct, at least 7n of its inedges are correct 
and also at least 7n of its outedges. 
Let Q be a condition on the set of admissible histories for processors PR 
and j be a natural number including infinity. We say that under condition 
Q an agreement algorithm {(Fp, Mp)[ p ~ PR} reaches EBA for j-finally 7- 
correct processors by phase k if, for each k phase history H on PR which 
satisfies Q, the following conditions hold: 
(I) There exists 1 ~< l~< k such that all processor, which are 7-correct 
from phase l - j  + 1 to phase l, have reached the same final state by phase l
and do not change it as long as they stay 7-correct. 
(II) I fp  is 7-correct from phase l - j+  1 to phase l and the transmit- 
ter is ;~-correct at the first phase, then the final state of p at phase l 
corresponds to the value of the transmitter. 
If in addition 
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(III) All processors, which are y-correct from phase l - j+  1 to l, 
reach their final state at phase l, 
holds, then we say that IBA is reached. 
The parameter j and condition Q specify how fast fault recovery has to 
be achieved, while 1 -y  determines what ratio of faulty links a correct 
processor can tolerate. The known algorithms assume y equals 1, j equals 
infinity and a condition corresponding to (1.1). This does not require fault 
recovery, but limits the set of admissible histories. One would like to reach 
agreement with small j and y < 1. 
Similar to (1.1) and (1.3) it can easily be shown that BA can be reached 
for histories in which per phase up to pn processors need not be 7-correct 
only if 1 -y  +p<½. Also (1.2) indicates that no algorithm can achieve 
early stopping (k < t + 1) for j = 1. 
3. THE ALGORITHM 
In this section we will present he basic algorithm for reaching EBA. Its 
fault tolerance is given by the following requirement: 
(3.0) n >~ 6rn + 1, where n denotes the total number of processors and 
c5 and m are specified by one of the following conditions: 
(3.1) 6 = 6 and in each 3-phase interval at most m processors are not 
correct within one of these phases. Communication links are always 
correct. 
(3.2) 6 = 20 and within each phase at most m processors are not 7- 
correct where y = 19/20. 
We will use two other parameters c~ and/~ and choose c~ = 1 and/~ = 0 in 
case of (3.1), and c~=3 and /~=1 for (3.2). Before giving the exact 
definition we will describe informally how the algorithm works. Consider 
the question whether at a given phase an individual processor p should 
support a value v (propose to agree on it). The decision ofp will depend on 
the messages received so far, usually by some sort of fixed threshold z on 
the number of processors that have supported v in the phases before. To let 
the processors agree on v a BA algorithm must require many processors 
supporting this value. 
Assume there are only 2 alternatives for p; support and no support. If the 
number of correct processors that have supported v in former phases is just 
a little less than the threshold then a few faulty processors can arrange any 
constellation of processors upporting (resp. not supporting) v at the 
current phase. The algorithm below allows 3 alternatives: no, low, and high 
support. For the division into these cases we need 2 thresholds Zo and V l. 
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Up to r0=(2~+f l )m,  p decides on no support; from there up to 
zl = (4~ + fl)m on low support; and above zl on high support. Again the 
number of correct processors upporting v, call it Nv, may be just a little 
less than one of these thresholds and faulty processors can force arbitrary 
constellations of either no and low support or low and high support. But it 
is not possible that all 3 alternatives each get a significant number of votes. 
Receiving a profile of different kinds of support, each processor has to 
decide how much support it gives to v at the next phase. Now comes the 
special processor Ps into play. It has only 2 alternatives, no and high sup- 
port, with a threshold ~s = (3~ + fl)m. Because of conditions (3.1) or (3.2), 
Ps is always below Zs" if Nv is around ~0, and above ~, if Nv is around zl. 
This gives a mechanism to converge the decision of the correct processors 
either to no or to high support; low supports are discarded if the special 
processor is below rs and are counted as support for v if p, is above rs. In 
this way all votes of correct processors are either counted as no support (if 
N~ is around %) or as support (if Nv is around rl). Thus as soon as one 
special processor is correct the decision of all correct processors will con- 
verge immediately. 
We now describe the sets MSG and STp the algorithm uses. As atomic 
messages only v and v,  for v E V will be needed, where * is one of the 
following tags: "low" or "high." The set STp of states for p includes 
elements (A, B, k) from [2 v] x [2 v] x { 1, 2,..., } with the following inter- 
pretation: A is the set of values which have high support, while B contains 
values with low support, k is a counter for the current phase. 
At some phase k during the algorithm it may happen that a processor p
has not yet reached a final state, but there are no values (atomic messages) 
p has to send at that phase. Since other processors must be able to dis- 
tinguish this case from the one in which p does not send messages 
anymore, because it has reached a final state, we make the following con- 
vention: in the first case we write Mp = ~ (p sends a message, but it does 
not contain any values), while Mp= 2 means that p does not send any 
message. 
For the time being we require that the system is completely synchronized 
and that an incorrect ransition of a processor may only influence the first 
two segments of its state. This means even during phases in which a 
processor is in the faulty mode it has to stay synchronized with he other 
processors. Later we will show how this condition can be relaxed. 
In the model of Section 2 final states do not have a counter for the 
current phase. If the state transition function excludes leaving a final state 
this is obviously not necessary. But the algorithm below will force a 
(correct) processor p to return back from a final state into a nonfinal state, 
if p entered the final state by an incorrect ransition. In this case p has to 
know the current phase number. Since in any case we will drop the con- 
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dition on synchronization later, we omit attaching phase numbers to final 
states when describing the basic algorithm below. 
Let k~> 1 and f (k )= [k'/2] + 1, where k'=-kmod(2n) and 0~k '<2n.  
We will use the auxiliary functions 
Wlow, Whigh, Wk: VxMSGn~{1, . . . ,n} .  
Wk will be used to lay importance on the special processor for phase k 
which will be Py(kl. For v ~ V and Xe MSG n, Wlow(V, X) counts how many 
elements of X include either V~ow or Vhig h. Whigh(V , X) counts only elements 
that include Vhigh. Wk(v, X) equals W~ow(V, X) if the f (k ) th  element of X 
includes Vhigh, otherwise it equals Whigh(V , X). 
For a set Ye2 v, [-Y]high denotes the set {YhighlYeY}. The same 
notation will be used for the tag "low." 
Let Ae2 v and X=(XI, . . . ,X,~)~MSG n. We say that predicate 
FINAL(A, X) holds iff except for (c~ + fl)m elements all the remaining Xi 
equal either [A'lhig h or  ,~. This predicate expresses a condition for a 
processor to enter a final state: a vast majority of processors either has 
stopped or sends the same set of values with high support and supports no 
other values. 
RULE 1 (Initialization). I f  v is the transmitter's value then pl is in state 
trv at the beginning of the first phase, every other processor is in state ~o. 
RULE 2. (Definition of M). Mp(a~)= {v}, Mp(tXo)= ;25. I f  s = (A, B, k) 
with A, B ~ 2 v and k >~ 1 then Mp(s)= [-A ] high k..) [B] low. For any other state 
s, Mp(s)  = ,~. 
(Notice that by convention in case 2 for A = B = ~ processor p sends the 
empty set as its message, while for a final state it sends no message at all. 
This will become important for the evaluation of the predicate FINAL.) 
RULE 3 (Definition of F). 
Phasel. Let xeMSG,  yEMSG "-1, and se{ao}U{a~[v~V }. I f  
x = { v } with v e V then 
Fp(x, y, s) = (x, ~ ,  1 ), 
else 
Fp(x, y, s) = ((25, (25, 1 ). 
Phase k > 1. Assume that at the beginning of phase k, p is in state s and 
during that phase receives messages X e MSG n. Define A, Be  2 r by: 
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For p ¢ Pz(~), v ~ V belongs to A iff Wk(v , X) > (4~ + fl) m, otherwise it 
belongs to B iff Wk(v, X) > (2c~ + fl) m. 
For Puck), v belongs to A iff Wk(v, X)> (3c~ + fl) m and B is empty. 
I f  s=(C ,D,k -1 )  with C, D~2 v and FINAL(C,X) holds then 
Fp(s, X) = r c. I f  s = rc for C ~ 2 v and FINAL(C, X) holds then Fp(s, X) = s. 
In any other case Fp(s, X) = (A, B, k). 
4. PROOF OF CORRECTNESS FOR CONDITION (3.1) 
Let H be a history that satisfies condition (3.l), in particular a correct 
processor is also 1-correct. An easy consequence of the definitions and the 
fact that at most m processors per phase may send conflicting messages to 
other processors i
LEMNA 1. I f  p, q are correct processors in H at phase k >~ 2 and J(, Y are 
the sequences of messages they receive at that phase, then for all v ~ V holds: 
I W low(V, X ) -  Wlow(V, Y)] ~< c~m 
] Whigh(V, X) - Whigh(V, Y)I ~< am 
I f  pf(K) is correct at phase k then 




Remember that c~ = 1 in case (3.1). For a processor p and a phase num- 
ber k ~> 1 let us denote by S(p, k) the state of p at the end of phase k in 
history H. If S(p, k) is of type (A, B, k) with A, Be2  v then SA(p, k) := A 
and SB(p, k) := B. Lemma 1 implies 
LEMMA 2. I f  t?/~k 1) and p are correct at phase k - 1 and are not in a 
final state at the end of that phase, then for all v ~ V holds: 
SA(p ,k -1 )cSA(p l -~k_ l ) ,k -1 )=SA(p ,k -1 )uSB(p ,k -1  ) (4.4) 
LEMMA 3. I f  f (k -  1)=f(k) ,  Pi(k) is correct at phase k -  1 and k, p is 
correct at phase k, and no processor has made a correct transition into a final 
state by phase k, then for all v ~ V holds: 
SA(p, k) = SA(pf~k), k) and SB(p, k) = ~.  (4.5) 
Proof At least 5m + 1 processors q are correct at both phases k -  1 and 
k. Since by assumption o processor has correctly reached a final state by 
phase k, S(q, k -  l) must be of the form (C, D, k -  1), where C and D are 
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subsets of V. If a given value v belongs to A := SA(pf(k_l), k -  1), then by 
(4.4) each such q will include Vhigh or rio, in its message sent to p at phase 
k. Since at the same time PsIk) sends Vhigh to p, for the sequence X of 
messages p receives at phase k Wk(v, X)> 5m holds. By assumption, 
neither Ps(k) nor p reach a final state at phase k. Rule 3 implies v ~ SA(p, k) 
and v ~ SA(pr(k), k). 
On the other hand it follows from (4.4) that for v not in A neither P(k) 
nor any processor, correct at phase k -  1 and k, sends Vhigh to p at phase k. 
Therefore Wk(v, X)<~m and v does not belong to SA(p, k), SA(pf(k), k), 
or SB(p, k). | 
The last two Lemmas essentially incorporate the way in which the 
correct processors are able to converge their decision about each value if a 
special processor works correctly in the two corresponding phases. 
LEMMA 4. Assume f (k -  1) =f(k) ,  Pf(k) is correct at phase k -  1 and k 
and no processor has made a correct transition into a final state by phase 
k + 1. Then all processors p that are correct at phase k + 1 and k + 2 reach 
the same final state by phase k + 2 and stay in it unless they become faulty. 
Proof If a value v belongs to A:-- SA(pr(k), k), then by (4.5) at least 
5m + 1 processors, correct at phase k and k + 1, will include Vhigh in their 
messages they send to p at phase k+ 1. This implies v~ SA(p, k+ 1). 
Otherwise at phase k+ 1 at most m processors, faulty at phase k or 
k+l ,  may send v with tag high or low to p. Hence S(p ,k+l )= 
(A, ~ ,  k + 1). At phase k + 2 only processors, faulty at phase k + 1 or k + 2, 
may send messages different from [A]high. This implies that for the 
message X, which p receives at phase k + 2, FINAL(A, X) holds and by 
Rule 3, S(p, k + 2) = ZA. 
If q is correct at phase k+ 2 (but possibly not a phase k+ 1), then 
S(q,k+2)=zA or S(q ,k+2)=(A ,~,k+2) .  Hence, at phase k+3 a 
correct processor recieves from processors, correct at phase k + 2 or k + 3, 
either [A]high or no message at all. For the sequence Y of messages q
receives at phase k + 3, FINAL(A, Y) is true and S(q, k + 3)= r A. One can 
easily show that for l > k + 3 holds: 
At phase l at most m processors, faulty at phase l -  1 or l, may 
send messages. Processors that are correct from phase k + 1 to l 
will not change their final states. Other processors, which are 
correct at phase l -1  and l, will be in final state at the end of 
phase /. (4.6) 
This implies that p will stay in its final state as long as it is correct. II 
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LEMMA 5. I f  no processor has made a correct transition into a final state 
till phase k, at phase k + 1 processor p is correct and reaches a final state, 
then all processors q, which are correct at phase k + 1 and k + 2, reach the 
same final state by phase k + 2 and stay in it unless they become faulty. 
Proof S(p, k) has to be either (A, B, k) or zA for some subsets A, B of 
V. Let X (resp. Y) be the messages p (resp. q) receives at phase k + 1. Since 
FINAL(A, X) holds, at phase k+ 1, p receives the message [-A]nig h from 
more than 5m processors, of which more than 4m are correct at phase k 
and k + 1. 
If q also reaches a final state at phase k + 1, then for the set C defined by 
S(q ,k+l )=zc ,  FINAL(C, Y) must hold. One can easily show that C 
equals A. 
Otherwise, by the same argument S(q, k + 1)= (A, ~ ,  k + 1). Hence at 
phase k + 2, processors, which are correct at phase k + 1 and k + 2, send 
either [A]high or no messages. This implies S(q, k + 2) = zA. At phase k + 3, 
at most m processors, which have to be faulty in at least one of the phases 
k + 1, k+ 2, or k+ 3, may send any message. Again (4.6) holds for any 
l>  k + 3 and q will not leave its final state unless it becomes faulty. | 
From the definitions and rules one can easily derive. 
LEMMA 6. I f  p 1 starts in state ~r~ and is correct at the first phase, then 
every processor, which is correct at phases 1 and 2, reaches the final state % 
at phase 2 and stays in it as long as it remains correct. 
Combining these lemmata and observing that f (2 r )=f (2r  + 1)= r + 1 
proves. 
THEOREM 1. Consider distributed systems without link failures and an 
actual processor failure rate of less than ~ for each 3-phase interval. Then for 
r >>. 1 the algorithm above reaches EBA for 2-finally correct processors by 
phase 2r + 3 for all histories in which at phases 2r and 2r + 1 the special 
processor is correct. I f  the transmitter is correct at the beginning this is 
already achieved at phase 2. 
In particular, if we do not differentiate between temporary and per- 
manent faults and do not require reintegration (j equals infinity), we get 
THEOREM 2. Let f denote the total number of processors ever faulty. I f  the 
ratio between fand  the total number of processors is less than ~ the algorithm 
above reaches EBA by phase 2f+ 3. 
Proof Let H be a history that satisfies the condition of the theorem. 
Among Pl and the special processors P2,..., Pj+ 1 for phases 2 up to 2f+ 1 at 
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least one must be correct during the whole history, in particular, during the 
two phases when it plays the special role. From Theorem 1 it follows that 
EBA is reached by phase 2f+ 3. | 
5. PROOF OF CORRECTNESS FOR (3:2) 
The proof for a history H satisfying condition (3.2) goes along the same 
lines as the former one and we will only indicate the differences. Now faulty 
links may also produce conflicting messages. Let us call a processor p
strong 7-correct at phase k if at that phase p is y-correct and in addition the 
link from Pr~k) to p is in the nonfaulty mode. From the definitions follows 
immediately 
LEMMA 0. I f  at phase k, v processors are y-correct including Pr~k) then 
more than v-  (1 -y )  n processors are strong y-correct at that phase. 
Since at each phase at most m processors may send conflicting messages 
and for each y-correct processor, at most m of its incoming links may not 
transmit correctly we get 
LEMMA 1. I f  p, q are y-correct in H at phase k >>. 1 and X, Y are the 
sequenees of messages they receive at that phase, then for all v ~ V (4.1) and 
(4.2) hold. I f  at phase k, p~ is correct and p and q are both strong y-correct 
then also (4.3) holds. (Remember c~ is chosen to be 3.) 
LEMMA 2'. I f  prig ~ and p are strong y-correct at phase k -  1 and are 
not in a final state at the end of that phase, then for all v ~ V, (4.4) holds. 
LEMMA 3'. I f  f (k  - 1 ) =f (k )  and PF(k) is strong y-correct at phase k - 1 
and k, p is strong y-correct at phase k and no processor has made a correct 
transition into a fi'naI state by phase k, then for all v ~ V, (4.5) holds. 
Proof From Lemma0 follows that more than 17m processors are 
strong y-correct at phase k -  1 and y-correct at phase k. (4.4) implies that 
all these processors will include each v E SA(pf(k_ 1), k -  1) with one of the 
tags in their message they send to p. More than 16m such messages will 
correctly be received by p. Since PAk) sends Vhig h to p, and by assumption p 
receives this message correctly, for the sequence X of messages, p receives 
at phase k, Wk(v, X)> 16m holds and we get v ~ SA(p, k). 
Neither pf~g) nor any q, strong V-correct at phase k -1  and correct at 
phase k, sends v not in SA(pf(k_l), k -1 )  with tag high to p at phase k. 
Since p has at most m faulty incoming links, W~(v, X) is bounded by 
4m. | 
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LEMMA 4'. Assume f (k -1 )=f (k ) ,  Pf(k) is strong y-correct at phase 
k -  1 and k and no V-correct processor has reached a final state by phase 
k + 1. Then all processors p', which are 7-correct at phase k + 1 and k + 2, 
reach the same final state at phase k + 2 and stay in it as long as they are V- 
correct. 
Proof Again the claim follows from the fact that more than 17m 
processors are strong V-correct at phase k and V-correct at phase k+ 1. 
Hence at phase k+ 1, p will find each yeA:= SA(pr(k), k) with tag high 
included in more than 16m messages, while v not in A with any tag may be 
sent by at most 3m processors, not strong V-correct at phase k or not 
correct at phase k + 1, and at most m faulty links. 
Therefore, at phase k+2 a 7-correct processor receives [A]hig h from 
more than 16m links and S(p, k+2)='c  A. At phase k+3 a V-correct 
processor will receive at most 3m messages. For l>k+ 3, a condition 
similar to (4.6) holds which guarantees that a processor does not leave its 
final state as long as it is V-correct. | 
LEMMA 5'. I f  no V-correct processor has reached afinal state till phase k, 
at phase k + 1 processor p is V-correct and reaches a final state, then all 
processors q, which are y-correct at phase k + 1 and k + 2, reach the same 
final state by phase k + 2 and stay in it as long as they remain y-correct. 
Proof Let X be the messages p receives at phase k + 1 and assume that 
FINAL(A, X) holds. More than 16m elements of X equal [A ]high, of which 
more than 14m must have been sent by processors correct at phase k + 1. 
Each v not in A will be received by q from at most 6m processors and at 
most m faulty edges, thus such a v does not belong to SB(q, k + 1). 
If q does not reach a final state at phase k+ 1, we get S(q, k+ 1)= 
(A, ~b, k + 1). Hence at phase k + 2, processors, which are V-correct at phase 
k+l  and k+2,  send either [A]hig h or no messages. Thus q receives at 
most 3m messages different from [A]hig h or 2. This implies S(q, k + 2)= rA. 
At phase k + 3 at most 3m processors, not V-correct in at least one of the 
phases k + 1, k + 2, or k + 3, and at most m faulty links, may send any 
message to a y-correct processor. | 
All together this proves 
THEOREM 3. Let 6=20 and y= 19/20. Assume that in a distributed 
system of size n at each phase less than n/6 processors are not y-correct. 
Then for r >~ 1 the algorithm above reaches EBA for 2-finally V-correct 
processors by phase 2r + 3 if at phases 2r and 2r + 1 the special processor is 
V-correct. 
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Remark. 6 and y can be varied in some range if we adjust the other 
parameters ,  and fl in the appropriate way. 
6. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS, REINTEGRATION, AND SYNCHRONIZATION 
In the definition of the state transition function F one can add the con- 
straint that each element of the sequence X of messages received at phase 2 
has to be a single value, otherwise it is replaced by the empty set. This 
prevents a faulty processor from introducing more than one value at phase 
2 and implies: 
For each history that satisfies either (3.1) or (3.2) there is a set 
W of at most 5 values with the property: If a y-correct processor 
made a transition into state (A, B, k) and k > 1, then the sets A 
and B contain only elements from W. (6.1) 
Thus the number of atomic messages correct processors have to exchange 
in each phase is bounded by O(n2). 
If within a given history at most f processors are faulty we get a worst 
case upper bound O(n2+ nZf) for the total number of messages, which is 
better by roughly a factor of n compared to the algorithms in Dolev, 
Reischuk, and Strong (1982). From (6.1) follows that at phase k every 
correct processor can specify its actual state by log k + O(log t V[) bits. If V 
contains many elements each processor might encode the actual values it 
has to consider after the first phase by short strings and store this encoding 
in memory. By (6.1) these are at most five, hence such an encoding would 
reduce the amount of bits that have to be updated at each phase. The 
processors could also exchange their private encodings; in this case each 
message sent in the remaining phases can be of constant length. 
Changing states requires only very simple computation. In addition, for 
all but final states a current state s of a processor p is almost independent 
of the former state s'; s is influenced only indirectly by s' through the 
message p sends to itself. For large n one could neglect such kinds of 
messages. In particular, assume that a processor was down for a while and 
comes up again without any knowledge about the present state of the 
algorithm except the number of the current phase. After receiving and 
correctly processing the messages of one phase, it can immediately continue 
its part in the algorithm as if it has been correct all the time. 
Finally we want to weaken the condition on synchronization. So far we 
require that the correct processors are completely synchronized and that 
even a faulty processor stays synchronized with the correct processors. 
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What we actually need is that its clock show the correct time at the 
moment it goes back into the nonfaulty mode. 
Instead of complete synchronization it is sufficient hat the individual 
clocks differ by only a small amount e, which is considerably smaller than 
the length of a phase A, and that the system periodically updates the 
individual clocks, for example, by running another BA algorithm. More 
details can be found in Lamport and Melliar-Smith (1984). 
For the purpose of reintegration let each processor include in its 
messages the current phase number. If a processor p has lost syn- 
chronization during the time it was faulty and wants to return into the 
correct mode at a certain point, within time 2A it will receive at least n -  m 
messages carrying the same phase number, assume this number is k. Let p 
chop off the first 2m and the last 2m messages with time stamp k, since they 
might have been sent by faulty processors or links and take, for example, 
the average of the time when the remaining messages were received. This 
approximately gives the point of time in phase k, when every processor 
expects the incoming messages. Until a new clock synchronization 
algorithm is finished, p can set its clock according to this value and it will 
deviate from the others by only a small amount. 
7. PROBABILISTIC ANALYSIS 
In the preceding sections we analysed the worst case behavior of the new 
algorithm. We now want to evaluate the performance under the 
assumption that faults are distributed in some random way. Only the 
question whether a processor or a communication link is in the faulty or 
nonfaulty mode will be determined by a random variable. If a fault actually 
occurs we do not make any assumptions on what kind of fault it is. The 
analysis will cover the worst things that may happen, like sending wrong 
information on purpose and forming collusions with other faulty 
processors. 
Let S be either a processor or a communication link, k ~> 1 and R(S, k) a 
random variable with values 0 or 1. S is in the nonfaulty mode at phase k if 
R(S, k) = 1, otherwise it is faulty. We require that 
R(S, k) and R(S', k') are independent for S¢S '  and k, k'~> 1. (7.1) 
For a distributed system one can assume that a failure of one processor 
does not influence the correct behavior of anybody else. Also a com- 
munication link can be considered as consisting of three parts, the com- 
munication channel itself and the connections of the channel to the two 
parties. If we count a failure of a connection as a fault of the corresponding 
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processor, the independence of processors and communication channels 
can be justified. 
Let p(S, k) be the probability that R(S, k) equals 0 and p (resp. q) be the 
maximum of p(S, k) for k ~> 1 and all processors S (resp. links S). We can 
assume 
the probability of the event {R(S,k)=O or R(S ,k+I )=O} 
does not exceed 2p, (7.2) 
since a failure of S at phase k is more likely to induce also a failure at 
phase k + 1. 
For r >i 1 let A(r) be the event 
{R(pl, 1)=0 and for all 2<~l<~r holds: R(pl, 21-2)=O or 
R(pl, 2 l -  1)=0}. 
It follows 
Prob(A(r)) ~<p(2p) r. 
If for a history H satisfying (3.1) the algorithm has not reached EBA by 
phase 2r + 3 then by Theorem 1, H must belong to A(r). Hence we get 
THEOREM 4. Let the probability distribution of processor failures satisfy 
(7.1) and (7.2) with a maximal failure rate p. Then for any history that 
satisfies condition (3.1) the algorithm described in Section 3 reaches EBA for 
2-finally correct processors by phase 2 with probability at least 1 -p  and by 
phase 2r + 3 with probability at least 1 --p(2p) r. 
For example, for p = 0.05, the algorithm will reach agreement within 5 
phases with probability at least 0.995 and its average runtime is smaller 
than 3. 
We now consider the case where communication links may be faulty. 
The probability p' that a given processor S is not 7-correct at a given phase 
can be bounded by the probability p that S is not correct plus the 
probability that more than (1 -7)n  of its links are incorrect. By 
Proposition 2.4 in Angluin and Valiant (1979) the tail of the binomial dis- 
tribution decreases exponentially fast, given by 
(~)qJ(1--q)n-J<'-,exp(--(!qT--1)2nq/3) 
j - -  [(1 -- T)n] 
if the individual ink failure rate q is less than 1 - 7. For example, choosing 
7 = 19/20 and q = 0.02 one gets the bound exp(-0.015n). For n >t 400 this 
value is less than 0.0025. Similar to above one can derive. 
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THEOREM 5. Let the probability distribution of processor and link failures 
satisfy (7.1) and (7.2) and let p (resp. q) be the maximal failure rate of 
processors (resp. links). If  q < 0.05 then for any history that satisfies (3.2) the 
algorithm above reaches EBA for 2-finally 0.95-correct processors by phase 
2r+3 with probability at least 1-p'(2p')  r, where p' is given by 
p + exp( -  6qn) and bq = ((0.05/q)- 1) 2 (q/3). 
For example, from the analysis above follows for q = 0.02 and p--0.04, 
p' ~< 0.0425 for n >t 400. 
Finally we want to estimate the probability that conditions (3.1) and 
(3.2) hold for a sequence of phases of length L. In practice, having only 
estimations for the probability of faults in the distributed system we cannot 
guarantee that these conditions hold for every history. But if we know that 
with high probability they stay true for quite a long time, then, even when 
repeatedly running this algorithm, we have to expect only very few incon- 
sistent agreements. 
Condition (3.1) (resp. (3.2)) is obviously satisfied if at each phase 
less than ~ of the total number of processors are faulty, (7.3) 
(resp. less than ~ of all processors are not V-correct). (7.4) 
In the following we will deal only with (3.2) and (7.4). Define 
X2p, 
\ p' 1) S 
Estimations imilar to the above yield that for individual processor failure 
rate p'<~0 the probability that at a given phase (7.4) does not hold is 
bounded by exp(-6p,n). By the same argument as for (7.2) we may assume 
that the probability that these conditions tay true for a sequence of L con- 
secutive phases is at least 
(1 - exp(-3p,n)) r >~ exp( -L/exp(3p, n)). 
Therefore within L=exp(ln) consecutive phases condition (3.2) gets 
violated with probability at most 
1 - exp( - exp(( l -  3p,) n)) ~< exp((l - 3p,) n). 
For l < bp, this is still exponentially small. This proves 
THEOREM 6. Assume that the failures (not V-correctness) of individual 
processors in a distributed system of size n are randomly distributed satisfy- 
ing (7.1) and (7.2) and the failure rate p' is less than 0.05. Then one can 
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repeatedly try to achieve BAs such that each individual agreement takes only 
constant time on the average. For l< 6p, and histories of  length exp( ln)  the 
probability that every agreement achieved during that time fulfills the con- 
dition of  BA is at least 1 -exp( ( l -  6q,) n). 
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